Free Practice Questions for Cisco 300-215 Exam

According to theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, during thepost-incident activityphase, it is critical to analyze lessons learned and update processes to ensure quicker and more efficient response in the future. Specifically:

Introducing a priority rating for incident response workloads(A) helps address the issue of team members being occupied with other tasks and unable to prioritize abnormal system activity. This ensures incidents are handled based on severity, not just workload.

Creating an executive team delegation plan(D) addresses the issue of delays due to unavailability of management for approvals. It ensures alternative decision-makers are available for swift action.

These strategies are based on the NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 recommendations and are highlighted in the Cisco guide’s post-incident activity phase (page 418), which emphasizeslessons learnedand how to reduce detection and response times for future incidents.

When suspicious activity is detected on a workstation, immediate steps need to be taken to preserve evidence and prevent further compromise:

Disconnecting the system from the network (C)is crucial to stop potential exfiltration of data or ongoing communications with a command-and-control server. This isolation prevents further spread or damage while preserving the state of the compromised system for further investigation.

Taking an image of the workstation (E)is part of the forensics acquisition process. It involves creating a bit-by-bit copy of the system’s disk, which preserves all evidence in its current state. This allows for thorough forensic analysis without affecting the original evidence.

These steps align with the best practices outlined in the incident response and forensics processes (as described in theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide). Specifically, in theIdentification and Containmentphases of the incident response cycle, it’s emphasized that isolating the system and preserving evidence through imaging are critical to ensuring both containment of the threat and successful forensic investigation.

If IPS and SIEM logs do not give enough insight into a file's behavior, the next logical step is to review theAntivirus solutionlogs. These logs often provide detailed behavior analytics such as:

File actions and access patterns

Registry modifications

File execution history

The Cisco CyberOps guide emphasizes AV logs as critical forensic artifacts for understanding endpoint-based infections, especially when beaconing or suspicious activity is suspected.

Process injectionis a tactic where malicious code is inserted into the memory space of another process, enabling it to run with the privileges and context of a legitimate application. The Cisco study guide explains that this method allows malware to "hide in plain sight" within trusted processes and evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.

It specifically notes:"Process injection techniques allow malware to execute within the memory space of a legitimate process, avoiding detection and taking advantage of the process's permissions.".

The correct next step in analyzing the malicious nature of the email is toevaluate the artifactsinCisco Secure Malware Analytics(formerly Threat Grid). This tool provides a comprehensive sandbox environment where behavioral indicators like file execution, registry access, and domain connections are logged and scored.

The exhibit shows:

Remote PowerShell execution

Executable download from a flagged domain

SHA256 hash linked to malware

All these artifacts, as labeled in the Secure Malware Analytics output, arekey indicators of compromise, and analyzing them further can confirm whether the email was part of a malicious campaign.

Thus, the best action is:

A. Evaluate the artifacts in Cisco Secure Malware Analytics.

The alert box in the screenshot ("HACKED BY 1337") is a classic sign ofCross-Site Scripting (XSS). This occurs when unvalidated input is executed as code in a browser.

To prevent this:

TheCisco CyberOps Associateguide recommendsstrict input validationas the primary defense against XSS and similar web-based injection attacks.

Since the phishing email originates from a known compromised cloud provider (XYZCloud), the correct immediate action for the security analyst is to determine the broader scope of exposure. This involves checking whether other users in the organization received similar emails from the same potentially malicious source. Therefore, querying for emails from theIP address rangesorSMTP domainslinked to XYZCloud is essential for identifying other possible attack vectors.

This step aligns with the containment phase of the incident response lifecycle, as outlined in theCyberOps Technologies (CBRFIR) 300-215 study guide, where threat hunting and log analysis are used to determine the extent of compromise and prevent lateral movement or further exposure. Only after the scope is understood should remediation or reporting actions follow.

The Wireshark capture shows a series of HTTP requests and responses:

The client (10.1.21.101) sends a GET request for/Lk9tdZ.

The server (209.141.51.196) responds withHTTP/1.1 302 Found, which is a standard HTTP status code indicating a redirection.

The subsequent GET request from the client is for/files/1.bin, which indicates it followed the redirect.

This behavior confirms that the server is issuing an HTTP 302 redirect from the initial request path/Lk9tdZto/files/1.bin. This is often observed in malware command-and-control behavior or file download staging.

Option A is incorrect: 302 is a status code, not a data size.

Option C is incorrect: port 49723 is a source/destination ephemeral port, not a redirect target.

Option D is incorrect: communication is over HTTP, not HTTPS (which would indicate encryption).

The metadata in the exhibit reveals a strong indicator that this .LNK file (shortcut) is malicious:

The shortcut file is named "ds7002.pdf" but actually points to the execution of PowerShell:→ Full path: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Arguments include:→ -noni -ep bypass $z = '...'; indicating an attempt to run a PowerShell script with execution policy bypassed (a known tactic for fileless malware delivery).

The file is masked as a PDF (common social engineering technique), and PowerShell execution via .LNK is a signature technique used by many malware families to initiate second-stage payloads or scripts.

Given this, the correct and safest course of action is to:

→ Open the .LNK file in a sandbox environment (D).

This enables safe behavioral analysis to observe what actions it attempts upon execution without endangering live systems.

Other options are inappropriate:

A (ignoring the threat due to extension) is dangerous — .LNKs can trigger code.

B (upload to virus engine) is only helpful for known malware and lacks behavioral context.

C (quarantine) is preventive but not investigative — sandboxing provides visibility.