Free Practice Questions for VMware 5V0-93.22 Exam

The impact of using the wildcards in the path is that all executable files in the “Program Files” folder and subfolders will be ignored, including malware files. This is because the double asterisk ** matches any files or directories in that path, and the Bypass action means that the sensor will notmonitor or block any operations performed by those files. This is a very permissive and risky rule, as it could allow malicious files to run without interference from the sensor. A more restrictive and secure rule would be to specify the exact path of the application that needs to be allowed, and use the Allow and Log action instead of Bypass. This way, the sensor will only ignore the specified application, and still log its operations for visibility and analysis. References: Carbon Black Cloud: How to Use Wildcards in Policy Rules, Set Permission Policy Rules

The most effective way to meet the goal of blocking ransomware in the organization is to turn on the performs ransomware-like behavior rule in the policies. This rule is a feature of VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard that uses behavioral analytics to detect and prevent actions that are typical of ransomware, such as encrypting files, deleting backups, or displaying ransom notes. By turning on this rule, the administrator can block any application that attempts to perform ransomware-like behavior, regardless of its reputation or signature. This can protect the organization from new or unknown ransomware variants that may not be detected by other methods. The administrator can also customize the rule to apply different actions, such as alert, deny, or terminate, depending on the policy configuration and the security needs of the organization.

The other options are not as effective or appropriate for blocking ransomware in the organization. Option A is not proactive, but reactive, as it relies on looking at current attacks to see if the software that is running is vulnerable to potential ransomware attacks. This may not be sufficient to prevent future attacks that use different software or exploit different vulnerabilities. Option C is not accurate, as analytics alone cannot automatically block all the attacks that may occur. Analytics can help toidentify and prioritize the most critical threats, but the administrator still needs to configure the policies and rules to block the attacks. Option D is not recommended, as it exposes the organization to unnecessary risk. Starting in the monitored policy until it is clear that no attacks are happening means that the administrator is not taking any preventive actions, but only monitoring the endpoint activity and logging the events. This may not be enough to stop or mitigate the impact of a ransomware attack, which can cause irreversible damage or data loss in a short time. References: Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard - Technical Overview, Best Practices:

To identify whether a sensor’s signature pack is out-of-date in VMware Carbon Black Cloud, the user can go to the Inventory page, select the Endpoints tab, and click on the device name of the endpointthey want to check. This will open the Endpoint Details page, where the user can see the Sensor Update Status, which shows the current version and date of the sensor’s signature pack, as well as the latest available version and date. If the current version is lower than the latest version, the sensor’s signature pack is out-of-date and needs to be updated. References: VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard Skills Reference Materials, Section 3.2.1: Monitor Sensor Health and Update Status, Page 25.

 The operation attempt that must use a Terminate Process action is Scrapes memory of another process. This is a policy rule in VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard that blocks and terminates any process that attempts to read the memory of another process. This is a common technique used by malware to steal sensitive information, such as passwords, encryption keys, or tokens, from legitimate applications. By using a Terminate Process action, the policy rule ensures that the malicious process is stopped and removed from the endpoint, preventing further damage or data exfiltration. The other operation attempts do not require a Terminate Process action, but they can use other actions, such as Alert, Deny, or Isolate Device, depending on the policy configuration and the security needs of the organization. References: Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard - Technical Overview, Best Practices: Endpoint Standard Blocking & Isolation Rules, Endpoint Standard: Deny/Terminate action taken on an Allowed Application

 A security benefit of VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard is that it provides visibility into the entire attack chain and customizable threat intelligence that can be used to gain insight into problems. Endpoint Standard uses behavioral analytics to detect and prevent malicious activity on endpoints, and also collects comprehensive event data that can be used to investigate and respond to incidents. Endpoint Standard also allows administrators to customize their threat intelligence feeds and alerts, and integrate with other security tools and platforms. This way, administrators can gain a deeper understanding of the threats facing their organization and take appropriate actions to mitigate them. The other options are incorrect because they are not security benefits of Endpoint Standard. Option A is incorrect because a flexible query scheduler is a feature of VMware Carbon Black Audit and Remediation, not Endpoint Standard. Option C is incorrect because customizable threat feeds are a feature of VMware Carbon Black Enterprise EDR, not Endpoint Standard. Option D is incorrect because policy rules that can be tested by selecting test rule next to the desired operation attempt are a feature of VMware Carbon Black App Control, not Endpoint Standard. References: VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard Datasheet, Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard - Technical Overview

The reputation that was used by the sensor for the decision to terminate the process was the effective reputation. The effective reputation is the reputation that the sensor uses to evaluate and enforce policy rules on the endpoint. The effective reputation is determined by the following factors:

The initial cloud reputation, which is the reputation that the Carbon Black Cloud assigns to the file based on its analysis and threat intelligence feeds.

The actioned reputation, which is the reputation that the administrator assigns to the file through the Carbon Black Cloud console, such as approve, ban, or dismiss.

The current cloud reputation, which is the reputation that the Carbon Black Cloud updates for the file based on new information or changes in the threat landscape.

The effective reputation is the highest priority reputation among these three factors. For example, if the initial cloud reputation is SUSPECT_MALWARE, the actioned reputation is APPROVED, and the current cloud reputation is KNOWN_MALWARE, the effective reputation will be APPROVED, because it has the highest priority. The sensor will use the effective reputation to apply the policy rules on the endpoint. In this case, the process will not be blocked by the rule [Suspected malware] [Invokes a command interpreter] [Terminate process], because the effective reputation is not SUSPECT_MALWARE.

In the question scenario, the effective reputation for the process was SUSPECT_MALWARE, which means that either the initial cloud reputation, the actioned reputation, or the current cloud reputation was SUSPECT_MALWARE, and there was no higher priority reputation that overrode it. Therefore, the sensor used the effective reputation to enforce the policy rule and terminate the process. References:

Endpoint Standard: How to Confirm Applied … - VMware Carbon Black, Resolution section.

The tool that the security administrator is using to remediate a security vulnerability that may affect the sensors is Live Response. Live Response is a feature of VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard that allows the administrator to perform remote investigations, contain ongoing attacks, and remediate threats using a command line interface. Live Response enables the administrator to interact with the sensors and access the endpoints in real time, using various commands and scripts. Live Response can also be used to upload or download files, execute processes, terminate processes, delete files, and more12.

The other tools are not relevant or applicable for this scenario. CBLauncher is a tool that allows the administrator to launch applications on the endpoint without triggering policy rules or alerts. CBLauncher is useful for troubleshooting application compatibility issues or testing new applications, but it does not provide interaction or remote access for further investigation3. PowerCLI is a tool that allows the administrator to automate and manage VMware products and services using PowerShell commands and scripts. PowerCLI is useful for administering VMware virtual machines, hosts, networks, storage, and more, but it does not provide interaction or remote access for further investigation4. IRepCLI is a tool that allows the administrator to generate and upload reputation information for files on the endpoint. IRepCLI is useful for enhancing the threat intelligence and detection capabilities of VMware Carbon Black Cloud, but it does not provide interaction or remote access for further investigation5. References:

Use Live Response - VMware Docs, Overview section.

CBLauncher - VMware Docs, Overview section.

Live Response Commands - VMware Docs, Overview section.

VMware PowerCLI Documentation, Overview section.

IRepCLI - VMware Docs, Overview section.

The best rule to prevent a spreadsheet from being misused to run malicious code, while minimizing the risk of breaking normal operations of a spreadsheet, is B. **\excel.exe [Invokes a command interpreter] [Deny operation]. This rule will prevent any Excel process from invoking a command interpreter, such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe, which is a common technique used by malware to execute malicious commands or scripts. This rule will deny the operation but not terminate the process, which may allow the spreadsheet to continue functioning normally. This rule is more specific and effective than option A, which only applies to Microsoft Office applications that run external code, or option C, which applies to Excel applications that communicate over the network. Option D is incorrect because it is too vague and may not catch all the possible ways that a spreadsheet can run malware.