Free Practice Questions for Juniper JN0-336 Exam

The correct answer is B. count. In Junos security policy configuration, count is the policy parameter used for accounting and tabular operational visibility. Juniper’s security policy configuration rules state that accounting and auditing elements can be specified with count and log, while logging itself is enabled at either session-init or session-close.

The operational result is visible through commands such as show security policies hit-count, which displays a table of policy hit counters, including fields such as index, from-zone, to-zone, policy name, policy count, and action. Juniper defines this command as displaying the number of times a security policy rule matches traffic, and the sample output is explicitly tabular. Option A, permit, is an action, not a counter or logging/accounting parameter. Option C, session-init, logs at the beginning of a session, and option D, session-close, logs at session teardown. Those two parameters generate logs, but they do not provide the tabular policy-count view being asked about. Reference topics: security policy accounting, count parameter, hit-count, operational-mode policy monitoring, session-init/session-close logging.

The correct answer is B. The IPsec VPN is established, and traffic is passing through . The exhibit shows nonzero ESP encrypted bytes , ESP decrypted bytes , encrypted packets , and decrypted packets . On an SRX Series Firewall, those counters indicate that the device is both encrypting outbound traffic into the IPsec tunnel and decrypting inbound ESP traffic from the remote peer. Juniper’s show security ipsec statistics reference identifies ESP statistics as the counters for encrypted/decrypted bytes and packets, and Juniper troubleshooting guidance states that incrementing encrypted and decrypted packet counters confirm traffic flow across the VPN.

Option A is wrong because the error counters show AH authentication failures: 0, Replay errors: 0, ESP authentication failures: 0, ESP decryption failures: 0, Bad headers: 0, and Bad trailers: 0. Option C is wrong because encrypted and decrypted ESP packet counters would not increment if the IPsec tunnel were not established. Option D is wrong because traffic is clearly passing; the nonzero ESP counters prove packet movement through the tunnel. Reference topics: IPsec VPN, ESP statistics, encrypted/decrypted counters, tunnel verification, IPsec troubleshooting.

The correct answers are A and B. In Security Director-managed environments, Security Director can download the signature database and then install the active signature database update on selected managed devices. Juniper’s Security Director workflow states that after the signature database is downloaded, you install the active database, select the target devices, and Security Director sends the full or incremental signature database update to those devices. That confirms that Security Director stores and manages the signature database package centrally for deployment.

Option B is also correct because the SRX Series device must have the application signature database installed locally for AppID/AppSecure features such as AppFW, AppTrack, AppQoS, and IDP application matching. Juniper’s AppID documentation states that the application package is installed in the application signature database on the device, and that AppID signature updates enable AppSecure features on the SRX.

Option C is wrong because Juniper provides and maintains the predefined AppID database through Juniper’s security download infrastructure, not a third-party host. Juniper explicitly describes the predefined application identification database as provided by Juniper Networks and updated through a subscription service. Option D is wrong because a local storage server can be used only as part of an offline/manual update workflow; it is not where the AppID database normally resides. Reference topics: Security Director, AppID database, application signatures, SRX AppSecure services, signature database installation.

The correct answer is A. The same cluster ID was used on both clusters. In an SRX chassis cluster, a redundant Ethernet interface, or reth, uses a cluster-derived virtual MAC address. When two separate chassis clusters are placed in the same Layer 2 domain and use the same cluster ID, their corresponding reth interfaces can generate the same virtual MAC address. That is exactly why the network team sees the same MAC address for reth0 from both clusters on VLAN 1042. Juniper community guidance states bluntly that the reth interface MAC address is derived from the cluster ID and that two clusters using the same ID produce identical MAC addresses.

Option B is wrong because split-brain would describe both nodes inside the same cluster thinking they are primary, not two separate chassis clusters producing the same reth MAC address. Option C is wrong because multiple SRX clusters can exist on the same VLAN if their cluster IDs are unique. Option D is wrong because LACP synchronization affects bundled link operation, not the generation of the reth virtual MAC address. The correction is to assign unique cluster IDs to clusters sharing the same Layer 2 segment. Reference topics: HA Clustering, chassis cluster ID, reth virtual MAC address, duplicate MAC prevention, Layer 2 cluster design.

The correct answer is D. exempt. In Junos IDP, the exempt rulebase is specifically used to prevent selected traffic from triggering known false-positive detections. Juniper’s IDP documentation explains that exempt rules can be configured when an IDP policy generates false positives for a particular attack object, source, destination, or traffic pattern. The exempt rulebase lets the administrator exclude matching traffic from attack detection while still allowing the rest of the IDP policy to inspect other traffic normally.

Option A, IPS, is wrong because the IPS rulebase is the main inspection rulebase used to detect and act on attacks. It is where attack objects and actions are commonly applied, but it is not the rulebase designed to eliminate false positives. Option B, monitor, is not the correct false-positive elimination mechanism. Monitoring can help observe behavior, but it does not exempt traffic from matching an attack object. Option C, signature, is wrong because signatures are attack-detection patterns, not a rulebase type used to suppress false positives. The operational correction for noisy or irrelevant matches is to create an exempt rule for the specific trusted source, destination, or attack object. Reference topics: IDP rulebases, exempt rulebase, false-positive tuning, attack objects, IPS inspection.

The correct answers are B and D. On SRX Series Firewalls, SSL proxy is configured by creating an SSL proxy profile and then applying that profile to the relevant security policy as an application service. Juniper’s SSL proxy configuration overview lists the required workflow: configure certificates and CA profile material, configure the SSL proxy profile, create a security policy matching the traffic to be inspected, and apply the SSL proxy profile to that security policy. Juniper further states that SSL proxy is enabled as an application service within a security policy, where the policy match criteria identify the traffic and the SSL proxy profile is applied to that traffic.

Option A is wrong because enabling the SSL ALG is not the required control point for SSL proxy. SSL proxy is a decryption/inspection service applied through policy, not simply an ALG toggle. Option C is wrong because creating a separate SSL application object is not the mandatory SSL proxy configuration action. The policy can match the desired traffic and then invoke SSL proxy through then permit application-services ssl-proxy profile-name. Juniper’s example explicitly shows applying the SSL proxy profile under the security policy action.

Reference topics: SSL Proxy, SSL forward proxy, SSL proxy profiles, security policy application-services, encrypted traffic inspection.

The correct answers are B and D. The command output is from the SRX Series device: show services user-identification identity-management status. Under Primary server, the exhibit shows Address: 192.168.1.10, Port: 443, Connection method: HTTPS, and Connection status: Online. In Juniper Identity Management Service integration, the SRX is the client that connects to the configured primary JIMS server. Juniper’s configuration workflow specifically describes configuring “the IP address of the primary JIMS server” under services user-identification identity-management connection primary address, and the verification output shows that primary server address with its connection status.

Option A is wrong because 192.168.1.10 is listed under Primary server, not as the local SRX address. Option C is also wrong because this SRX command verifies the SRX-to-JIMS identity-management connection, not the backend JIMS-to-domain-controller connection. Domain controller reachability would be validated from JIMS or through JIMS-specific status/monitoring, not by this SRX-side output. The displayed Online state and OK (200) status confirm that the SRX successfully reached the JIMS HTTPS service and received a valid response. Juniper examples use the same status command to validate that the SRX identity-management connection to JIMS is online.

Reference topics: Identity-Aware Security Policies, Juniper Identity Management Service, SRX-to-JIMS connectivity, identity-management status verification.

The correct answers are A and D. In IKEv1-based IPsec VPNs, there are two distinct negotiation phases. IKEv1 Phase 1 establishes the secure and authenticated IKE channel between peers. That means the IKE SA is built during Phase 1. Juniper describes Phase 1 as the negotiation of proposals for how to authenticate and secure the channel, including encryption algorithms, authentication algorithms, Diffie-Hellman group, and authentication method.

IKEv1 Phase 2 then uses that secure channel to negotiate the IPsec SAs that protect actual user traffic through the VPN. Juniper states that Phase 2 negotiates security associations to secure the data traversing the IPsec tunnel, and that the Phase 2 proposal includes the security protocol, such as ESP or AH, plus the selected encryption and authentication algorithms. Option B is wrong because IKEv1 SAs are not established in Phase 2; Phase 2 creates IPsec SAs. Option C is wrong because Phase 1 does not create the data-plane IPsec SA; it creates the secure IKE control channel used for Phase 2 negotiation. Reference topics: IPsec VPN, IKEv1 Phase 1, IKE SA, IKEv1 Phase 2, IPsec SA, ESP/AH proposals.

The correct answers are B and C. To form an SRX chassis cluster, both devices must be assigned the same cluster ID and different node IDs. Juniper states that the cluster ID identifies the cluster, while the node ID identifies the individual node within that cluster. A valid two-node SRX chassis cluster uses node 0 on one chassis and node 1 on the other chassis. Juniper’s example shows the operational-mode commands as set chassis cluster cluster-id 1 node 0 reboot on the first device and set chassis cluster cluster-id 1 node 1 reboot on the second device.

Option A is wrong because cluster-id 0 disables clustering rather than forming a cluster. It also shows configuration-mode prompt #, while this chassis cluster node assignment is performed from operational mode. Option D is doubly wrong: cluster-id 0 disables clustering, and node 2 is invalid because SRX chassis cluster node IDs are limited to 0 and 1. The exam options omit the reboot keyword, but the only logically valid pair is still SRX1 as node 0 and SRX2 as node 1 under the same nonzero cluster ID. Reference topics: HA Clustering, chassis cluster ID, node ID, operational-mode cluster enablement.