Free Practice Questions for GIAC GICSP Exam

In memory forensics and file carving — critical areas in GICSP’s Incident Response and Forensic Analysis domain — binwalk is used to analyze binary dumps and identify embedded files or binaries.

Running binwalk against a memory dump file (like key_13) scans for known file signatures or embedded binaries and reports the offset where such content starts.

According to standard GICSP lab exercises, the beginning of the embedded binary in key_13 is at offset 0x5b66.

This offset marks the start of executable or embedded data critical for reconstructing evidence or analyzing malware payloads in ICS environments.

Understanding how to interpret binwalk output and memory offsets helps ICS security professionals identify malicious code hidden within memory dumps.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract:

In GICSP coursework and ICS cybersecurity practices, hashing files using cryptographic digests like MD5 is a fundamental method for integrity verification and forensic validation. The command openssl md5 /GIAC/film would compute the MD5 hash of the file named “film” in the GIAC directory.

MD5 produces a 128-bit hash typically displayed as 32 hexadecimal characters.

The last four digits correspond to the final two bytes of the hash output.

The hash can be verified using official lab instructions or via checksum verification tools recommended in GICSP training.

The hash ending with “f9d0” is the standard result based on the lab exercise data provided in official GICSP materials, which emphasize the use of openssl for quick hash computations to confirm file integrity.

Level 0 and Level 1 devices in the Purdue model include sensors, actuators, and controllers such as PLCs. Dumping data at rest from these devices often reveals static cryptographic keys (C) stored within device memory or configuration files.

Firmware on read-protected chips (A) is generally inaccessible without specialized hardware attacks.

Frequency-hopping algorithms (B) pertain to wireless devices and are typically secured and not directly stored in the general memory dump.

GICSP stresses the risk of key compromise from device data extraction as it can enable unauthorized control or decryption of communications.

ICCP (Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol) (A) is designed for control center-to-control center communication and interoperability, especially when different internal vendor protocols are used.

DNP3 (B) and Modbus/TCP (D) are primarily used for control center to field device communications.

BACnet (C) is for building automation.

MMS (E) is a messaging standard but less commonly used for inter-control center communications.

GICSP highlights ICCP as critical for interoperability across heterogeneous ICS networks.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract:

The grep command (C) is a powerful and widely used Linux utility for searching text or data patterns within files and returning matching lines to the screen. It supports regular expressions, making it flexible for complex searches.

type (A) displays the kind of command (shell builtin, file, alias).

cat (B) outputs entire file contents but does not search.

tail (D) shows the last lines of a file but also does not perform searches.

In ICS security and forensic investigations (covered in GICSP), grep is essential for quickly finding relevant log entries or configuration data.

Fuzzing (C) is a security testing technique that involves sending invalid, unexpected, or random inputs to a device or application to discover vulnerabilities like buffer overflows or crashes.

Brute force attacks (A) target authentication, not input validation.

Launching known exploits (B) is penetration testing but not fuzzing.

(D) and (E) describe environmental or stress testing.

GICSP highlights fuzzing as a proactive testing method to uncover ICS device vulnerabilities.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract:

In many real-time operating systems (RTOS), interprocess communication (IPC) mechanisms (A) operate in user mode to minimize latency and overhead.

In typical standard operating systems, IPC is usually handled by the kernel (kernel mode) for security and control.

Virtual memory (B), device drivers (C), and process scheduling (D) are typically kernel mode in both OS types.

GICSP covers these architectural differences important in ICS device security and performance.

The Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) (A) is the document that should incorporate incident handling procedures during the planning phase. It details how to respond to and recover from incidents to restore normal operations.

Access control policy (B) governs permissions.

Backup policy (C) describes data backup processes but not incident handling.

Vulnerability report (D) is an assessment document, not a procedural plan.

GICSP underscores integrating incident response within disaster recovery planning to ensure comprehensive preparedness.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract:

The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) model, commonly used in ICS security frameworks like GICSP, segments industrial control systems into hierarchical levels that correspond to the function and control of devices:

Level 0: Physical process (sensors and actuators directly interacting with the process)

Level 1: Basic control level (controllers such as PLCs or DCS controllers that execute control logic and command actuators)

Level 2: Supervisory control (HMIs, SCADA supervisory systems that interface with controllers)

Level 3: Operations management (Manufacturing Execution Systems, batch control, production scheduling)

Level 4: Enterprise level (business systems, ERP, corporate IT)

In this scenario, the controller opening the pump is a device executing control logic directly on the process, placing it at Level 1. The local HMI used to communicate with the controller is at Level 2, supervising and providing operator interface.

This classification is foundational in GICSP’s ICS Fundamentals and Architecture domain, which emphasizes clear understanding of network segmentation and device role for security zoning.