Free Practice Questions for Amazon Web Services DOP-C02 Exam

The problem is that the DevOps engineer cannot assume the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in the new member account that joined AnyCompany’s management account through an Organizations invitation. The solution is to create a new IAM role with the same name and trust policy in the new member account.

Option A is incorrect, as it does not address the root cause of the error. The DevOps engineer’s IAM user already has permission to assume the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in any member account, as this is the default role name that AWS Organizations creates when a new account joins an organization. The error occurs because the new member account does not have this role, as it was not created by AWS Organizations.

Option B is incorrect, as it does not address the root cause of the error. An SCP is a policy that defines the maximum permissions for account members of an organization or organizational unit (OU). An SCP does not grant permissions to IAM users or roles, but rather limits the permissions that identity-based policies or resource-based policies grant to them. An SCP also does not affect how IAM roles are assumed by other principals.

Option C is correct, as it addresses the root cause of the error. By creating a new IAM role with the same name and trust policy as the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in the new member account, the DevOps engineer can assume this role and access the account. The new role should have the AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy attached, which grants full access to all AWS resources in the account. The trust policy should allow the management account to assume the role, which can be done by specifying the management account ID as a principal in the policy statement.

Option D is incorrect, as it assumes that the new member account already has the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role, which is not true. The new member account does not have this role, as it was not created by AWS Organizations. Editing the trust policy of a non-existent role will not solve the problem.

ECR Lifecycle Policies automatically manage image retention based on tag status, age, or count. They execute natively within the ECR service, requiring no external management or scripts — the least overhead and AWS-recommended cleanup method.

Amazon ECR supports enhanced scanning powered by Amazon Inspector, which provides deeper security scanning for container images including OS and programming language package vulnerabilities.

Enabling enhanced scanning (Option B) allows detection of CRITICAL and HIGH vulnerabilities.

Amazon ECR emits scan completion events via EventBridge, which can trigger Lambda functions. The Lambda function can process the scan results from Amazon Inspector and programmatically approve or reject the image in the CI/CD pipeline (Option D).

Basic scanning (Option A) is limited and does not integrate with Inspector.

Options C and E describe functionalities not natively supported (ECR does not automatically submit Rejected status; Clair is not used in AWS ECR scanning).

Step 1: Understanding the Deletion FailureThe most likely reason why the CloudFormation stack failed to delete is that the S3 bucket was not empty. AWS CloudFormation cannot delete an S3 bucket that contains objects, so if the website files are still in the bucket, the deletion will fail.

Issue: The S3 bucket is not empty during deletion, preventing the stack from being deleted.

Step 2: Modifying the Custom Resource to Handle DeletionTo mitigate this issue, you can modify the Lambda function associated with the custom resource to automatically empty the S3 bucket when the stack is being deleted. By adding logic to handle the RequestType: Delete event, the function can recursively delete all objects in the bucket before allowing the stack to be deleted.

Action: Modify the Lambda function to recursively delete the objects in the S3 bucket when RequestType is set to Delete.

Why: This ensures that the S3 bucket is empty before CloudFormation tries to delete it, preventing the stack deletion failure.

This solution will meet the requirements because it will use Amazon Inspector to scan the EC2 instances for any new vulnerabilities and generate findings that can be viewed in the Inspector console or sent as notifications via Amazon Simple Notification Service (SNS). It will also use the Amazon CloudWatch Agent to collect and send system logs from the EC2 instances to Amazon CloudWatch Logs, where they can be stored, searched, and analyzed. The system logs can provide an audit trail of all login activities on the instances, as well as other useful information such as performance metrics, errors, and events.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/inspector/latest/user/what-is-inspector.html

The requirement specifies enforcing encryption before CloudFormation creates or updates resources. This is key because preventive enforcement must occur during the provisioning workflow, not after resources already exist. AWS provides CloudFormation Hooks specifically for this purpose. A Hook allows an organization to intercept a CloudFormation stack operation and validate resource configurations before provisioning occurs. This feature is recommended by AWS for pre-deployment governance such as enforcing encryption policies, tag compliance, or security restrictions.

By enabling trusted access between CloudFormation StackSets and AWS Organizations, the Hook can be deployed centrally from the delegated administrator account across all accounts in the specified OU. Any attempt to create or update EBS volumes or SQS queues through CloudFormation is validated first by the Hook. If encryption is not configured, the operation fails immediately.

Option C (SCP) blocks API calls globally, but SCPs cannot perform conditional logic based on resource properties passed by CloudFormation prior to creation. Option B (AWS Config) detects violations after resources already exist, which does not satisfy “before stack operation.” Option D (Lambda remediation) also occurs after the resource is created.

Thus, CloudFormation Hooks distributed via StackSets provide the only solution that enforces compliance before the provisioning lifecycle

When using the awslogs log driver with Amazon ECS on EC2, CloudWatch Logs permissions must be granted to the ECS container instance IAM role , not the task definition or infrastructure role. The ECS agent running on the EC2 instances is responsible for creating log streams and pushing log events to Amazon CloudWatch Logs on behalf of the containers.

In this scenario, the task definition is correctly configured to automatically create the log group (awslogs-create-group: true) and send logs to the specified Region. However, the error occurs because the EC2 container instances do not have sufficient IAM permissions to perform the required CloudWatch Logs API calls. As a result, ECS cannot place the task, and it reports that no container instance meets the requirements.

According to AWS documentation, the container instance IAM role must include the following permissions when using the awslogs driver:

logs:CreateLogStream

logs:PutLogEvents

(and, when creating log groups automatically) logs:CreateLogGroup

Option C correctly addresses the root cause by updating the container instance IAM role . Option A is incorrect because the ECS infrastructure or service role is not used to write logs. Option B is unrelated to permissions and does not resolve the issue. Option D would fail because the log group does not already exist, causing task startup to fail.

Therefore, modifying the container instance IAM role is the correct solution.

Use CodePipeline with a Git source to orchestrate the flow, CodeBuild to produce versioned artifacts in S3, and CodeDeploy to EC2 with lifecycle hooks (e.g., BeforeInstall) to run cache-clearing and unpack steps. This gives end-to-end visibility, rollbacks, and standardized deployments.

For gradual traffic shifting in Lambda deployments, AWS Lambda aliases support the RoutingConfig property, which specifies the percentage of traffic routed to different versions of the Lambda function. This enables weighted traffic shifting between versions as part of deployment strategies.

The AWS::Lambda::Alias resource’s RoutingConfig can specify multiple versions with weights, enabling canary or linear deployment strategies without needing CodeDeploy resources explicitly.

AWS CodeDeploy resources like DeploymentConfig and DeploymentGroup are used primarily for blue/green deployments and managing deployment strategies outside Lambda aliases.

Lambda versions themselves do not have a VersionWeight property; instead, weighted routing is managed via aliases.