Free Practice Questions for PRMIA 8008 Exam

The capital adequacy ratio, also called the minimum capital requirement for credit risk per Basel II is 8% of risk weighted assets. The other choices are incorrect.

In the February of 2009, the Federal Reserve (which is the US central bank system) and other US banking regulators embarked on a simultaneous assessment of the capital held by the 19 largest US bank holding companies. This was an unprecedented exercise of a kind never undertaken before, and was known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). The purpose of the exercise was to determine the amount of additional capital (called the 'capital buffer') each of the institutions covered would need to ensure that it would have sufficient capital if the economy weakened more than was then expected. The idea was that these financial institutions would then raise additional capital equal to their respective capital buffers by the fourth quarter of 2009.

Statement I is false on two counts: firstl the SCAP was conducted by the US central bank and other regulators, and not the 'Treasury Department' (the Treasury Department in the US is the equivalent of the Ministry of Finance in may other countries). Second, the SCAP was a one time exercise, and not annual.

Statement II is correct. The regulators prescribed rates of losses on credit assets of different kinds and other macro-economic assumptions, and asked the banks to determine the extent of losses they would need to bear (in addition to calculating them independently too). Therefore the SCAP was a stress test where the scenario was prescribed by the regulators.

Statement III is false. Capital buffer under the SCAP referred to the additional capital the banks would need to have certain ratios of capital, and not 'excess' capital.

Statement IV is correct. The SCAP envisaged two capital targets: a Tier 1 capital ratio in excess of 6% at the end of 2010; and a Tier 1 common capital ratio in excess of 4%. Therefore both the total Tier 1 capital and Tier 1 common capital were targeted.

Therefore Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

Normal mixtures, EVT and the t-distribution are all possible solutions addressing the issue of heavy tails in financial returns.

EWMA and GARCH address volatility clustering, which is the other problem when doing risk calculations. Therefore Choice 'b' is the correct answer as EWMA is not used to address heavy tails but volatility clustering.

Economic capital is often calculated with a view to maintaining the credit ratings for a firm. It is the capital available to absorb unexpected losses, and credit ratings are also based upon a certain probability of default. Economic capital is often calculated at a level equal to the confidence required for the desired credit rating. For example, if the probability of default for a AA rating is 0.02%, and the firm desires to hold an AA rating, then economic capital maintained at a confidence level of 99.98% would allow for such a rating. In this case, economic capital set at a 99.8% level can be thought of as the level of losses that would not be exceeded with a 99.8% probability, and would help get the firm its desired credit rating.

Choice 'c' is the correct answer. Economic capital does not target minimizing the cost of capital, nor is it a provision for losses arising from market risk. The concept of economic capital is unrelated to where an institution or firm is based, therefore Choice 'a' is incorrect as well.

Current replacement values are a very poor measure of the credit exposure from a derivative contract, because the future value of these instruments is unpredictable, ie is stochastic, and the range of values it can take increases the further ahead in the future we look. Therefore it is common for credit exposures for derivatives to be measured using forward looking exposure profiles, which are distributions of the expected value of the derivative at the time horizon for which credit risk is being measured. To be conservative, a high enough quintile of this distribution is taken as the 'loan equivalent value' of the derivative as the exposure. Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

The notional value of derivative contracts generally tends to be quite high and unrelated to their economic value or the counterparty exposure. Therefore notional value is irrelevant.

Choice 'd' is the correct answer, as laid down in the Basel II document. The other choices are incorrect.

Analytical or parametric approaches are not useful at all for liquidity at risk calculations because there are no neat distributions available to parameterize the large number of factors that affect the calculations of liquidity inflows and outflows. Historical simulations, Monte Carlo and scenario analysis (which can complement historical scenarios) are all valid choices

Odds are the ratio between the probability of the occurence of an event to the probability that the event does not occur.

If odds are H, then p = H/(1 + H) and H = p/(1-p). In this case the odds are 1:5, or 1/5, therefore the correct answer is Choice 'a', equal to (1/5)/(1 + 1/5) = 1/6 = 16.67%. All other choices are incorrect.

Some parts of this question draw upon contingent claims framework to the value of a firm. According to this framework, the relationship between the debt and equity holders of a firm can be viewed as follows: The equity holders have a call option on the assets of the firm with a strike price equal to the value of the debt, and the debt holders have sold them this call. This is so because should the value of the assets of the firm fall below the value of the debt, the equity holders can walk away by handing over the assets to the debt holders in full extinguishment of their claims. If the value of the firm's assets is greater than the value of debt, the equity holders will exercise their call option. At the same time, it is also possible to view the debtholders as holding an asset and having sold a put on the assets of the firm with a strike price equal to the value of the debt. If the value of the assets of the firm were to fall below the value of the debt, they will end up buying the assets at a price equal to the value of the debt.

An increase in the volatility of returns on the assets of a firm increases the volatility of the asset value. This means the likelihood that the asset value will go below the value of the debt of the firm will increase. Callable debt can be considered to be a summation of two separate securities: a regular debt, for which the firm pays interest and receives a principal loan; and a call option that the debt holders have sold to the firm allowing the firm to buy back the debt. In return, the firm pays an implied 'premium' to the debt holders who have agreed to buy the callable debt. Therefore the total payments by the company to callable debt holders is equal to the interest payments plus the premium payment for the option. An increase in asset volatility will increase the value of this option as it is likely that the assets will increase in value, and strengthen the company's credit, and lower its spread at which time it would like to repay the debt and refinance/roll over at the new lower rate. Therefore an increase in volatility will increase the 'premium' demanded by the callable debt holders, thereby increasing the total yield and lowering the value of the callable debt. Therefore Choice 'b' (An increase in the value of the callable debt of the firm) is incorrect.

An increase in asset volatility will decrease the value of the firm as it is now riskier than before (higher standard deviation, same expected returns). Therefore Choice 'a' (An increase in the value of the equity of the firm) is false too.

The value of the implicit put in the debt of the firm will increase and not decrease as the volatility of the underlying assets increases. Therefore Choice 'c' (A decrease in the value of the implicit put in in the debt of the firm) is incorrect too.

Choice 'd' (A decrease in the value of the non-callable debt issued by the firm) is correct because higher asset volatility will increase the riskiness of the company's debt, making the required yield higher and decreasing its value.

Units of Measure for operational risk are homogenous groupings of risks to allow sensible modeling decisions to be made. For example, some risks may be fat-tailed, for example the risk of regulatory fines. Other risks may have finite tails - for example damage to physical assets risk (DPA) may be limited to the value of the asset in the question.

Additionally, risk reporting may need to be done at the line of business, legal entity or regional basis, and in order to be able to do, so the right level of granularity needs to be captured in the risk modeling exercise. The level of granularity applied is called the 'unit of measurement' (UoM), and it is okay to adopt all of the choices listed above as the dimensions that describe the unit of measure.

Note that it is entirely possible, even likely, to use legal entity, risk type, region, business and other dimensions simultaneously, though doing so is likely to result in an extremely large number of UoM combinations. That can be addressed by then subsequently grouping the more granular UoMs into larger UoMs, which may ultimately be used for frequency and severity estimation.