Free Practice Questions for Google Professional-Cloud-Security-Engineer Exam

The problem requires automating user provisioning to a Cloud Identity security group using a service account, adhering to Google-recommended practices and the principle of least privilege.

Cloud Identity Groups and Google Workspace: Cloud Identity groups are managed as part of Google Workspace. To programmatically manage Google Workspace resources (like groups), you typically use the Admin SDK APIs.

Domain-Wide Delegation: Service accounts cannot directly authenticate to Google Workspace APIs using IAM roles. Instead, they require "domain-wide delegation" to impersonate a user with the necessary administrative privileges within Google Workspace. This allows a service account to access user data or perform administrative tasks across the domain. The correct scope for managing groups is https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.group.Extract Reference: "To allow a service account to access user data on behalf of users in a Google Workspace domain, you must delegate domain-wide authority to your service account." (Google Cloud documentation: https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/service-account#delegating)

Extract Reference (Admin SDK Scopes): The https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.group scope is explicitly listed for "View and manage all groups on the domain." (Google Workspace Admin SDK documentation: https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/directory/v1/scopes)

Application Default Credentials (ADC) with Resource-Attached Service Account: Google-recommended practices strongly advise against using service account keys directly for authentication when running on Google Cloud infrastructure. Instead, it's recommended to use Application Default Credentials (ADC) with a service account attached to the resource (e.g., a Compute Engine VM, Cloud Run service, or Cloud Functions). This method manages credentials automatically and securely, reducing the risk associated with managing and rotating keys.Extract Reference: "For most Google Cloud services, Application Default Credentials (ADC) is the recommended way to authenticate." and "When running code in a Google Cloud environment, such as Compute Engine, Cloud Run, or Cloud Functions, use the built-in service account to authenticate automatically with ADC. This is the most secure approach, as you don't need to manually create or manage service account keys." (Google Cloud documentation: https://cloud.google.com/docs/authentication/production)

Options C and D are incorrect because granting an IAM role like "Groups Editor" in Google Cloud does not enable a service account to manage Google Workspace (Cloud Identity) group memberships; domain-wide delegation is required for that. Option A uses a service account key, which is less secure than ADC with a resource-attached service account according to Google's recommendations.

Therefore, option B is the most aligned with Google's recommended practices for securely automating group provisioning using a service account and domain-wide delegation.

Understanding Unmanaged Users:

Unmanaged users are those who have created Google Cloud accounts using their company email addresses outside of the organization's management (e.g., through GCDS).

Challenge:

The goal is to bring these unmanaged accounts under your company's control without disrupting their existing accounts and access.

Using the Transfer Tool:

Google provides a transfer tool specifically designed to migrate unmanaged users to a managed state.

This tool allows administrators to invite unmanaged users to join the organization's Google Cloud Identity or Google Workspace account.

Steps to Use the Transfer Tool:

Step 1: Access the transfer tool from the Google Admin console.

Step 2: Identify the unmanaged users using their email addresses.

Step 3: Send invitations to these users to transfer their accounts.

Step 4: Users accept the invitations, allowing their accounts to be managed under the organization's domain.

Benefits:

This method ensures a smooth transition for users without losing access to their existing data and services.

It aligns with best practices for managing user accounts in a corporate environment.

To provide on-premises hosts with access to Google APIs without using public IP addresses or the public internet, Google Cloud provides Private Google Access for on-premises hosts. This feature allows traffic to stay within the Google network via Cloud Interconnect or Cloud VPN.

According to the official Google Cloud Documentation (Configuring Private Google Access for on-premises hosts):

"Private Google Access for on-premises hosts provides a way for on-premises systems to connect to Google APIs and services by routing traffic through a Cloud VPN tunnel or Cloud Interconnect attachment (VLAN). On-premises hosts don't need public IP addresses; instead, they use internal IP addresses."

Key Implementation Steps:

Network Connectivity: Ensure your on-premises network is connected to your VPC via Cloud Interconnect or VPN.

DNS Configuration: You must configure your on-premises DNS to map API requests (like storage.googleapis.com) to special IP ranges. There are two primary options:

private.googleapis.com: Resolves to 199.36.153.8/30. This range supports most Google APIs but only those that are VPC-Service Control compatible.

restricted.googleapis.com: Resolves to 199.36.153.4/30. This is required specifically when using VPC Service Controls (VPC-SC) to ensure data cannot be exfiltrated to services outside the perimeter.

Routing: You must configure custom static routes in your VPC or use BGP to advertise the 199.36.153.8/30 (or 199.36.153.4/30) range back to your on-premises router.

Why other options are incorrect:

A is incorrect: Shared VPC is used to share a network across multiple Google Cloud projects, not to extend a VPC directly to on-premises hardware.

C is incorrect: While the IP range 199.36.153.8/30 is correct for private.googleapis.com, Cloud NAT is used for outbound internet access from VPC instances without external IPs; it does not facilitate private on-premises-to-API connectivity.

D is incorrect: VPC Peering connects two VPCs within Google Cloud. You cannot "peer" an on-premises data center directly via VPC Peering; you must use Interconnect or VPN.

Rotating a user-managed Service Account key involves creating a new key, updating your application to use the new key, and then deleting the old key to maintain security. Here’s the step-by-step process:

Create a New Key: Use the Google Cloud Console or gcloud command-line tool to create a new key for the service account. This generates a new key pair and provides you with the private key.

gcloud iam service-accounts keys create new-key-file.json --iam-account=YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL

Update Application: Update your application configuration to use the new key. This might involve replacing the old key file with the new one or updating the environment variables or configurations that point to the key file.

Delete the Old Key: Once you have confirmed that the application is working correctly with the new key, delete the old key from the service account to ensure it cannot be used for unauthorized access.

gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete OLD_KEY_ID --iam-account=YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL

This process ensures that your service account keys are regularly rotated, reducing the risk of key compromise.

References

Managing Service Account Keys

Service Account Key Rotation

To ensure that the developers can view audit logs for the development environment and the security team can review all logs, you should grant IAM roles at the appropriate resource levels:

Grant logging.admin Role to the Security Team:

Assign the logging.admin role to the security team at the organization resource level.

This grants the security team full access to all logging data across the organization, including both production and development environments.

Grant logging.viewer Role to the Developer Team:

Assign the logging.viewer role to the developer team at the folder resource level that contains all the development projects.

This restricts the developers' access to only view logs in the development environment, ensuring they do not have access to production logs.

By using these roles and assigning them at the appropriate levels, you ensure that each team has the access they need while adhering to the principle of least privilege.

IAM Roles for Cloud Logging

Resource Hierarchy in Google Cloud

Objective: Quickly recover a deleted service account used for data transfers.

Solution: Use the undelete command available in the gcloud command-line tool to recover the service account.

Steps:

Step 1: Open the Cloud Shell in the Google Cloud Console.

Step 2: Run the following command to list the deleted service accounts:

gcloud iam service-accounts list --filter="deleted: true"

Step 3: Identify the name and ID of the deleted service account.

Step 4: Use the undelete command to recover the service account:

gcloud iam service-accounts undelete [SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID]

Step 5: Verify that the service account has been restored and reassign any necessary permissions.

By using the undelete command, you can quickly restore the service account and resume application functionality without compromising security.

Objective: Synchronize security groups with email addresses from an LDAP directory to Cloud IAM.

Solution: Use Google Cloud Directory Sync (GCDS) to perform one-way synchronization based on LDAP search rules.

Steps:

Step 1: Download and install Google Cloud Directory Sync (GCDS) on a secure server.

Step 2: Configure GCDS with the LDAP server details and authentication.

Step 3: Define LDAP search rules to filter security groups based on the “user email address” attribute.

Step 4: Map LDAP security groups to Google Cloud IAM roles.

Step 5: Set up a synchronization schedule to keep the groups in sync.

Step 6: Perform a test sync to ensure that the configuration is correct.

Step 7: Activate the synchronization to keep the LDAP directory and Cloud IAM in sync.

Using GCDS for one-way synchronization ensures that the security groups in Cloud IAM are consistently updated based on the LDAP directory, maintaining alignment with the organization’s security policies.

Storing secrets securely is crucial for maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of your applications. Here is how you can achieve this using Google Cloud Platform:

Encrypt the Secrets: Use Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK) to encrypt your secrets. CMEK allows you to have greater control over the encryption keys used to protect your data. This ensures that even if the storage medium is compromised, the secrets remain protected by strong encryption.

Store in Cloud Storage: Store the encrypted secrets in Google Cloud Storage. Cloud Storage is a secure and scalable object storage service. By using encrypted storage, you can ensure that the secrets are securely stored and can only be accessed by authorized entities.

This method provides a secure and managed way to store secrets, ensuring that they are not exposed in plain text within your source code management system.

References

Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK)

Google Cloud Storage Security

This is a Customer-supplied encryption keys (CSEK). We generate our own encryption key and manage it on-premises. A KEK never leaves Cloud KMS.There is no KEK or KMS on-premises. Encryption at rest by default, with various key management options https://cloud.google.com/security/encryption-at-rest

Multiple network interfaces. The simplest way to connect multiple VPC networks through a virtual appliance is by using multiple network interfaces, with each interface connecting to one of the VPC networks. Internet and on-premises connectivity is provided over one or two separate network interfaces. With many NGFW products, internet connectivity is connected through an interface marked as untrusted in the NGFW software.

https://cloud.google.com/architecture/best-practices-vpc-design#l7

This architecture has multiple VPC networks that are bridged by an L7 next-generation firewall (NGFW) appliance, which functions as a multi-NIC bridge between VPC networks. An untrusted, outside VPC network is introduced to terminate hybrid interconnects and internet-based connections that terminate on the outside leg of the L7 NGFW for inspection. There are many variations on this design, but the key principle is to filter traffic through the firewall before the traffic reaches trusted VPC networks.